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**152**

**GOVERNMENT INDIGENIST POLICY AND THE  
WAIMIRI-ATROARI INDIANS: INDIGENIST  
ADMINISTRATION, TIM MINING AND THE  
CONSTRUCTION OF DIRECTED INDIAN  
“SELF-DETERMINATION” IN  
BRAZILIAN AMAZONIA**

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## **GOVERNMENT INDIGENIST POLICY AND THE WAIMIRI-ATROARI INDIANS:**

### **Indigenist Administrations, Tin Mining and the Construction of directed Indian "Self-determination" in Brazilian Amazonia [1]**

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#### **Introduction**

The Waimiri-Atroari, Indian population of the Carib language family, inhabit part of the north of Amazonas State and the south of Roraima, in the basins of the Rivers Alalaú, Camanaú, Curiuaú and the Igarapé Santo Antônio do Abonari. Up to the beginning of this century the territory occupied by these Indians was very much more extensive than today, including the basins of the Rivers Jauaperí and Uatumã. After a long history of violent invasions [2], closely related to fluctuations in the prices of forest products on the international market such as Brazil-nuts, latex, otter and alligator skins, and tropical hard woods, the Waimiri-Atroari were driven into a territory where they remained until the 1970s.

Estimates of the Waimiri-Atroari population in the past are very contradictory. Hübner e Koch-Grünberg (1907:232) mention that there were "6.000 Indians on the River Jauaperí, according to the Brazilians". However, the regional population to whom they referred were at war with the Indians at the time and had just incentivated the local government to undertake a punitive expedition against the Indians (Ibid. pág.229), having an interest in presenting a high estimate of the Indian population. According to the Indian Census of August 1959, undertaken by the government Indian agency "Serviço de Proteção ao Índio" (S.P.I.) there were 957 Waimiri-Atroari in contact with the Camanaú and Alalaú Indian Posts. There are, however, no estimates of the Indian population which was not in contact with the Indian Agency Posts. In 1973, the administrator of this area, Gilberto Pinto Figueiredo Costa, of the "Fundação Nacional do Índio" (FUNAI) (new name given to the government Indian agency in 1967), admitted that "The Attraction Front does not have real

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[1] A Portuguese version of this paper was elaborated in 1991. My special thanks to Prof. Julio Cezar Melatti for having read the first draft and made some helpful suggestions. The responsibility for the contents of this paper is, however, entirely mine.

[2] The history of invasions and massacres has been documented since the middle of the last century (Barbosa Rodrigues, 1885; Payer, 1906; Hübner e Koch-Grünberg 1907; Bandeira, 1926; in the Reports of the Province of Amazonas, and in the Indian Protection Service [S.P.I.] and National Indian Foundation [FUNAI] reports). In 1856, Major Manoel Pereira de Vasconcellos and 50 soldiers undertook a massacre in Indian villages in the River Jauaperí basin, marking the beginning of 30 years of war and military expeditions against the Indians. Barbosa Rodrigues established peaceful contacts with the Indians and founded a settlement on the banks of the River Jauaperí in 1885. Later interethnic conflicts include the sending of 50 soldiers from the police in 1905, who killed 283 Indians, taking 18 prisoners.

data about the number of Indians... However, estimates of the signatory of this Report are of around 600 to 1000 Indians" [3]. In 1983, after more than a decade of lethal epidemics, only about 332 Waimiri-Atroari survived (Baines, 1988:109), although, since that year, the population has been recovering rapidly, especially during the period from 1983 to 1987 [4].

From the late 1960s, the federal government started a massive occupation of the Waimiri-Atroari territory through large development projects. The BR-174 highway that links Manaus to Boa Vista, cut through the middle of the Waimiri-Atroari territory, the extension which passes through their area being constructed from 1972-1977. In the beginning of 1979, mining companies of the Paranapanema Group invaded the Indian Reserve which had been delimited some years before by Decree N° 68.907, 13-07-71. In 1979, work was also begun on the construction of Balbina Hydroelectric Scheme by the government company Electronorte. The Presidential Decree N° 85.898, 13-04-81, declared an area of approximately 10.344,90 km<sup>2</sup> to be of public utility for expropriation, superimposed over the area delimited as an Indian Reserve. The expropriated area includes the lake and the region of influence of the Hydroelectric Scheme. The limits of the Indian area were occupied by cattle-raising and colonisation projects.

After having invaded and occupied part of the Waimiri-Atroari Reserve, mining companies of the Paranapanema Group resorted to cartographic manipulations to "legalize" the dismemberment of approximately 526,800 hectares (see Baines, 1991). The dismemberment of the area of immediate interest to Paranapanema was brought about by the Presidential Decree n° 86.630, 23.11.81, and has since become one of the largest tin mines in the world.

The Waimiri-Atroari were submitted to a FUNAI "Attraction Front" [5] which accompanied the construction works of the BR-174 highway within the Indian territory from 1970, in which a large contingent of FUNAI workers imposed an "accelerated integration" plan, congregating the Waimiri-Atroari survivors in settlements close to the Indian Posts where they were incorporated into a disciplinary regime of agricultural labour directed by FUNAI employees. From 1987, the "Programa Waimiri-Atroari" [6] took over

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[3] Report of the Waimiri-Atroari Attraction Front, 27-10-73, FUNAI, pp.v and vi.

[4] In the following four-year period the rate of populational increase shows a slight decline, from 26.5% a 20.2% (Silva, 1990).

[5] The "Frente de Atração Waimiri-Atroari" (FAWA) was implanted by FUNAI in 1970, having "as its principal objective the task of attracting ... the Waimiri-Atroari ... accelerating their process of integration into the national society, and the task of giving assistance to the BR-174 highway construction work" (Report of the FAWA, 27.10.73). The FAWA followed a policy, since its implantation, of maintaining a very large contingent of FUNAI workers in the area (more than one hundred in 1977), with the aim of abruptly submitting the Waimiri-Atroari survivors of epidemics and interethnic conflicts to a forced resocialisation by means of a disciplinary work regime in settlements directed by FUNAI. In 1983, there were 59 FUNAI workers in the area, when the Waimiri-Atroari population had been reduced to less than 350 people (Baines, 1988:99).

[6] The "Programa Waimiri-Atroari" (Agreement FUNAI/ELETRONORTE), financed by ELETRONORTE with funds from the World Bank, is planned for 25 years duration. It was intended as a means of compensating the Indians for the flooding of part of their territory, in

the direction of the indigenist [7] policy in the area.

After this, a new mega-project was implanted - Calha Norte Project (Projeto Calha Norte) - different from previous projects, since it "does not have the rigid and systematic structure of a programme or plan ... It consists of the formulation of a group of directions and aims with which all government initiatives directed towards this region should become compatible" (Oliveira, 1990:18). Most of the Waimiri-Atroari territory was incorporated within the space called "Regional or 'Interior' Nucleus" by this Project (p.2), situated between the spaces called "Frontier Strip" and "Riverine Zones". The Calha Norte Project, elaborated in secrecy by the National Security Council in 1985, is a military project which has as its ostensible objective the occupation of the northern frontier of Brazil by implanting military outposts. It is cast in a rhetoric of national security, the so-called foreign threat of socialist regimes in the Caribbean region, Colombian guerrillas, and narcotraffic. However, the military and strategic interests are only one part of the intentions of the Calha Norte Project and among the "fundamental and immediate necessities, judged as a top priority" for the region by the General-Secretary of the National Security Council, are the "amplification of the highway infrastructure; acceleration in the production of hydroelectric energy; inland penetration of poles of economic development; and amplification of the offer of basic social resources" [8]. Taking this into consideration, the Waimiri-Atroari territory served as a precursor of the new military-big business model for occupying the north of Amazonia. In this process of occupation, indigenist policy has been constantly subordinated to economic interests which involve large private and government companies. Ramos (1990) stresses that among the problems created by the Calha Norte Project for the Indians was the drastic reduction of their traditional territories (see also Albert, 1991; Buchillet, 1990 and Oliveira, 1990).

In recent years, the occupation of the Waimiri-Atroari territory reveals a close

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consequence of the decision to construct the Balbina Hydroelectric Scheme, without previously consulting the Indian population. The programme of assistance was created in the final phase of construction of the Balbina dam and just a few months before the floodgates were closed in October 1987, flooding an area of about 2360 square kms. All the area flooded was part of the traditional territory of the Waimiri-Atroari up to the early 1970s, and about 311 square kms. of flooding was inside the reduced area that has been reserved for the Waimiri-Atroari. The flooding transformed all the headwaters of the Rivers Uatumã, Santo Antônio do Abonari and Taquari into an uninhabitable area with putrefaction of the submerged tropical forest, forcing the removal of about one third of the total Waimiri-Atroari population to other parts of the Reserve. Viveiros de Castro & Andrade affirm that these "palliative and tardy measures, of cosmetic character, taken when all decisions about the construction work had already been carried into effect" have been used to create "a false idea of 'participation'" (1988:16). The present Programa Waimiri-Atroari offers an assistencial infrastructure subordinated to the fait accompli of the flooding of part of the Indian territory and the irreversible modification of the environment.

[7] I use the word "indigenist" to apply to policies formulated by non-Indian directed administrations for Indians, to distinguish from "Indian" policies formulated by the Indians themselves.

[8] Exposition of Motives N° 018/85, 19th June 1985, Gen. Bda. Rubens Bayma Denys, Minister of State, General-Secretary of the National Security Council.

articulation between FUNAI, the Army and private mining companies aiming at redirecting the Indians' lifestyle according to large company interests. From the early 1980s, the indigenist policy for this region has been shaped by and subordinated to the interests of two large companies - Paranapanema and Eletronorte - which have far greater economic powers than FUNAI, creating a unique situation of large company action over the Indian population which fits in well with the objectives of the Calha Norte Project. This can be seen by the amplification of the infrastructure in the Reserve, the increase in control over the Indians, the promotion of Indian leaders - called "captains" [9] - who act as spokesmen for FUNAI and the companies which are advancing over their territories, incorporated in roles created by the indigenist administration as obedient executors of orders and middlemen who transmit orders with the duty to obey their superiors and keep silent about matters considered inconvenient to the administration.

The new indigenist policy is also characterized by the prohibition over the access of ethnologists and missionaries to Indian territory (see Oliveira, 1990:30). As Oliveira stresses, "...people who work with Indian groups in this region (Amazonia) who are not part of the FUNAI staff, are characterized as enemies of the country, since they practise actions which are contrary to the so-called **national interests**" (1990:20).

Despite the specificities of this Indian area, the indigenist policy shares many similarities with the government indigenist policy for other Indian areas. This is the case, for example, in the attitude towards research. Ethnological research with Indian populations in Brazil shares one particular characteristic by the fact that entry to most Indian areas is controlled by FUNAI. This control exercised over the entry and activities of the researcher becomes most evident in territories where there are natural resources, especially minerals coveted by large companies, and/or the construction of large infrastructure projects such as highways and hydroelectric schemes. From the early 1970s, FUNAI's action, subordinated to the developmentalist policy of the federal government which is itself articulated to large company interests, has been to consistently give support to the implantation of large projects, to the detriment of the Indian populations and to research.

As in other Indian territories, especially those incorporated within the Calha Norte Project, the indigenist administration in the Waimiri-Atroari area has been following a policy of systematically showing hostility to and prohibiting the presence of independent ethnologists who are not subordinated to the interests which the government indigenist administrations in the areas defend. Obtaining a monopoly of control over the Indian population, its movements and its access to information, the indigenist administration spreads among the Indians an ideology which attends to the interests of the companies that are in the area, resorting to arguments and accusations that appear in the Calha Norte Project.

In this new pattern of indigenist policy, from the moment that the ethnologist applies for authorization to enter an Indian area, he (she) is subjected to a control by

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[9] The role of "captain" was institutionalized by FUNAI during the "pacification" period. The "captains" were, principally, young men, recruited from among the Waimiri-Atroari as intercultural agents rendering services to the indigenist administration, who transmit orders from the team of functionaries to the other Waimiri-Atroari in exchange for privileges such as an unequal access to manufactured goods. Since 1978, a young man and his brother, among the first Waimiri-Atroari who came to live in an Indian Post, were chosen by the administration as the principal captain and his substitute.

functionaries at several levels of FUNAI's bureaucratic hierarchy: in the headquarters in Brasília, the regional administration, the administrative direction of the area, and heads of Indian Posts, and the opinions of these FUNAI staff over the Indians who are subordinated to the local administrative structures. At any level the application for authorization can be interrupted when the presence of the researcher is seen as inconvenient to the administration.

In 1987, the anthropologist Márcio Silva of The University of Campinas (UNICAMP), São Paulo, was banned from the Waimiri-Atroari area without FUNAI presenting any convincing justification. The researchers Bruce Albert (ORSTOM/Universidade de Brasília) and Alcida Ramos (Universidade de Brasília) had their authorizations to do research among the Yanomami suspended for a long period, as also happened to Dominique Buchillet (ORSTOM/Universidade de Brasília) who works on the Upper Rio Negro. The authorization of Gilio Brunelli (University of Montreal) was not renewed to continue research with the Zoró.

My own experience of being banned from the Waimiri-Atroari Indian area was articulated by some functionaries of the government indigenist administration using a discourse permeated by references to Indian self-determination to make it appear that the decision was made independently by the Waimiri-Atroari. However, the "banning" was defined and directed by the indigenist administration, as part of an official version of the reality, transmitted as an order from the functionaries of the administrative direction of the Programa Waimiri-Atroari by means of the captains to the rest of the Waimiri-Atroari population. As Oliveira states, such "power apparatuses", used over the Indians, "operate with their own dynamism and cannot, under any circumstances, be confused with the reasons and motivations of the tribal populations which they legally aim to protect or represent" (1989a:5).

### **"The Waimiri-Atroari Attraction Front": The Censor**

During the seventeen months of fieldwork carried out in several stages between 1982 and 1985 in the Waimiri-Atroari territory, I witnessed the banning from the area of a number of FUNAI employees, in consequence of the climate of intrigues established by the indigenist policy itself (see Baines, 1988: 424s. and 518-521). At this time, a model of "banning" was already being formulated by some FUNAI employees with its own rhetoric, which included expressions such as "Liar!", "Thief", "Good for nothing!", "Only cheating Indians!" After the previous stage of fieldwork with the Waimiri-Atroari, in 1985, a missionary and his family who were carrying out a literacy project and an ethnologist who was doing fieldwork for his doctorate, were banned from this Indian area, at the end of 1986 and in 1987 respectively.

During the periods that I was in the area, the FUNAI team was made up principally of workers who identified themselves as Indians[10], from other ethnic groups than the Wai

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[10] The report "Analysis of Workers Posted in the NAWA (Waimiri-Atroari Assistance Nucleus) in 08-07-79", written by the FUNAI administrative director of the area, Giuseppe Cravero, reveals that 68% of the workers were from "several 'acculturated' Indian areas". According to this Coordinator, of the "Indian" workers, there were 29 from the Rio Negro, 29 from the Lower Amazonas, 3 from the River Purus and 7 from other areas. The majority of these employees had worked in cities of the region for several years and some in large development projects such as the

miri-Atroari. Following a policy of putting a minority of non-Indian workers in jobs as heads of Indian Posts to which a large contingent of acculturated Indian workers were subordinated as labourers, FUNAI created, in this area, a situation which aggravated the Indian/White opposition. There was a constant tension between White heads of Indian Posts and Indian auxiliary workers, many of the latter scheming together to try to get White workers banned from the area, with the aim of gaining the much higher paid jobs as heads of Indian Posts. They frequently appealed to the generic identity of "Indian", valued in an indianized counter-culture discourse of "Indian" to "Indian" against "Whites", establishing intimacy with the Waimiri-Atroari with the principal object of instigating them to reject the White heads of Indian Posts and to demand that the administrative director of the Waimiri-Atroari Attraction Front appointed Indian workers in their place.

The power struggle in the "Attraction Front" came to be expressed in an indigenist rhetoric which masked the fact that the FUNAI workers who identified themselves as "Indians" or "civilized Indians" were treating the Waimiri-Atroari with the same depreciatory stereotyped prejudices of the national society, as "Indians" and "caboclos" [11], as were the non-Indian workers. They identified themselves, in the first place, as FUNAI workers, presenting themselves to non-Indians as being more adequate to work with the Waimiri-Atroari for being "Indians too", while their behaviour, as FUNAI workers, was little different from that of the non-Indians. Many of the Indian workers, placed as subdominators between the non-Indian FUNAI workers and the Waimiri-Atroari, also resorted to a discourse of "Indian" to "Indian" against "Whites" when addressing the Waimiri-Atroari, as a strategy to exercise control over the information that the Waimiri-Atroari gave to me, labelled by these same FUNAI workers as a "White".

The indigenist rhetoric used by many of the FUNAI workers of the FAWA, demanding that the Waimiri-Atroari adopt a posture of being "self-conscious politicized 'Indians'", in the generic sense, who position themselves and act in opposition to "Whites", presented a contradiction in the context of the Attraction Front. It proposed a redefinition of "Indian" as united against "Whites", when the asymmetrical social relations, imposed on the Waimiri-Atroari by the team of FUNAI workers (Indians and Whites) were contradictory and of subordination-domination (Cardoso de Oliveira, 1976:55). In this context, in addition to plotting intrigues against White workers and involving the Waimiri-Atroari, some of these Indian workers tried to monopolize the local commerce of Waimiri-Atroari handicrafts (officially controlled by the administrative direction of FUNAI), entering into private agreements with the captains to sell the Waimiri-Atroari products in Manaus and bring industrialized goods. They also told the Waimiri-Atroari that, as Indian workers, they had been authorized by FUNAI to have sexual access to the Waimiri-Atroari women [12] and, in exchange, took some Waimiri-Atroari men to centres of prostitution

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construction of the "Perimetral Norte" Highway in the region of São Gabriel da Cachoeira in the early 1970s, the construction of the BR-174 within the Waimiri-Atroari territory (1972-1977) and the construction of the Balbina Hydroelectric Scheme, begun in 1979.

[11] Pejorative term often used with a several meanings such as "half-caste", "civilized Indian", and frequently with the connotation of "yokel", "country bumpkin".

[12] The Regional FUNAI Delegate discovered later that this was happening: radio message No.840, 09-04-85, and removed about 30 workers involved.

when these were staying at the FUNAI "Indian House" in Manaus. They also entered into agreements with the captains to conceal from some White heads of Indian Posts and administrative directors the fact that they frequently consumed alcoholic beverages while working at Indian Posts.

In these plots, the Indian identity was extended to include all the FUNAI workers who participated in them, independent of ethnic criteria: it was equally manipulated to exclude Indian workers who did not participate. In order to reconcile these contradictions in the use of ethnic identities, the workers involved often redefined the Indian/White opposition as "FUNAI"/ "real Whites". They also used the opposition "peão" (manual labourer)/"White" (to refer to functionaries in jobs as heads of Indian Posts or administrative directors). Thus, the Indian Post situation reproduced at the local level the power structure of FUNAI and the national society: the establishing of social relations of subordination/domination between generic Indians and Whites, and also between Waimiri-Atroari Indians on the one hand, and White and Indian workers from other ethnic groups on the other.

The indigenist administration acted as a total institution and many workers (Indians and Whites) transmitted to the Waimiri-Atroari a developmentalist model which defended the interests of mining companies of the Paranapanema Group to advance further over the Indian territory, presented in a rhetoric of Indian self-determination. The very concept of "self-determination" was subordinated to a context of domination, imposed by functionaries in the form of a "directed self-determination" transmitted as an order from the indigenist administration to the Waimiri-Atroari captains incorporated in subaltern positions in its bureaucratic hierarchy. This became clear to me in the control exercised by the indigenist administration over my access to information through the Waimiri-Atroari captains. I cite, as an example, a visit which General Euclides Figueiredo, ex-Military Commander of Amazonia, made to this Indian area in 1984, together with a retinue of 17 representatives of FUNAI, Mineração Taboca S.A. (Paranapanema) and the Army, to inaugurate a school constructed by Paranapanema at one of the FUNAI Indian Posts. The FUNAI workers and the Waimiri-Atroari maintained total secrecy about the matter. During the days before the inauguration of the school, I heard commentaries about a future visit to the area. However, when I asked the Waimiri-Atroari and workers about the matter, they withheld information. The principal captain delegated two Waimiri-Atroari to take me to visit some abandoned Indian villages and, when I returned to the Terraplenagem Indian Post some days later, I was informed that the retinue had visited the area and that the principal captain had made a speech thanking the General and representatives of Paranapanema [13]. Any attempts I made to directly or indirectly approach the question of the presence of the mining company in the area dismembered from the Indian Reserve were

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[13] The inauguration of the school took place on 06.01.84 (*A Notícia, e Jornal do Comércio*), Manaus, 07.01.84). This school was constructed in 1983, beside Terraplenagem Indian Post on the edge of the BR-174 highway, attending a request made by General Euclides Figueiredo, who had promised a school to the Waimiri-Atroari's principal captain during a previous visit to this Indian area on 24.06.83, together with a retinue of army personnel, representatives of Paranapanema and the Regional Delegate of FUNAI. On 28.06.83 and the following days, a series of meetings were held in Manaus between representatives of Mineração Taboca and the Army to discuss a proposal for a government edict aiming to revise government indigenist policy to facilitate the entry of private mining companies in Indian areas.

met with censorial attitudes from the captains and younger Waimiri-Atroari who worked together with the FUNAI team, and from the majority of FUNAI workers.

In consequence of this recent development of rhetoric about Indian identity imposed on the Waimiri-Atroari at all the Indian Posts and settlements, the "Indian" identity was extended by the workers, in their indianized rhetoric addressed to the Waimiri-Atroari, to include all the FUNAI workers who participated in the imposition of a censor over information to people labelled "Whites", regardless of their ethnic identity. The censor was reinforced, in my case, as a researcher, by the fact that some White FUNAI functionaries in the administrative direction often reminded the workers and the Waimiri-Atroari that I "was not a FUNAI employee".

If the conditions for the Waimiri-Atroari and for the field-worker were difficult at that time, they became even more so in the period which followed. In order to exemplify the increase in the degree of control over the Waimiri-Atroari since the creation of the Programa Waimiri-Atroari (FUNAI/ELETRONORTE), in 1987, and the hostility towards the presence of ethnologists, I shall now describe the banning of my research in this Indian territory, in June 1989.

### **The "Programa Waimiri-Atroari": Ethnological Research Prohibited**

In December 1988, I applied to the National Research Council (CNPq) and FUNAI for authorization to continue ethnological research with the Waimiri-Atroari. When they knew of my research proposal, some functionaries of the Programa Waimiri-Atroari presented a negative image of my research to the Waimiri-Atroari. The then director of the Educational Sub-Programme, in a "note" dated 10.01.89, during a "preliminary consultation" with the Indian area [14], requested "that the researcher send his written works about the Waimiri-Atroari - theses, comments, booklets, books, etc... based on the previous period of research in the area... that the research proposal should be more succinct, more detailed, clearer". He also questioned the "benefits" of the research for the Indians, stating that "neither this director nor the Waimiri-Atroari know the result of the research".

I emphasise that I had submitted reports to FUNAI after each period of research [15] and a copy of my doctorate thesis in 1988, as well as providing copies of photographs for the Waimiri-Atroari whenever they asked for them during my fieldwork. If this director had not received copies of this material, it was in consequence of a lack of co-ordination between the Programa and FUNAI and not an omission on the part of the researcher. This "note" reveals that from January 1989, the above-mentioned director presented to the Waimiri-Atroari in the settlement behind Terraplenagem Indian Post, where the principal captain resides, who has been appointed as the Waimiri-Atroari spokesman for the indigenist administration, the attitude that my research "did not bring any immediate benefits" for the Waimiri-Atroari.

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[14] I only found out the date of this "note" written by the coordinator of the Educational Sub-Programme during a meeting in which my research was banned on 25 June 1989, since the Programa's manager did not permit me to read it..

[15] Including a report for a Work Group in 1985, a vocabulary of the Indian language in 1983, (according to some people who were in the area during the last months of 1989, this vocabulary was still being used by the Educational Sub-Programme), and some copies of photographs.

Oliveira, commenting on the norms that control access to Indian Reserves and determine the consultation of FUNAI's regional offices and the consent of the Indians themselves (established by Edict nº 745 issued by FUNAI's president) states that "The majority of anthropologists know from their own experience how much administrators consider inconvenient the presence of a researcher in their area of jurisdiction and the arguments which they usually use to avoid having to put up with a research situation" (1988b:2).

The FUNAI norm which stipulates "that the research will only be approved after hearing the Indian leaders and obtaining their acquiescence" [16] is, continues Oliveira, "retrograde and demagogical. It is clear that ... every abuse and all intimidations will no longer be the responsibility of FUNAI or the local administrators, but from now on will be exercised in the name of Indians" (Ibid.), which is what happened in my case.

Oliveira stresses:

*Who can guarantee (or better, who can believe) that there can be a free manifestation of will on the part of the Indians, as long as the consultation is made by FUNAI functionaries, with interests clearly different (when not antagonistic) to those of the Indians? Nothing guarantees that such a consultation process be carried out without spurious constraints, without the diffusion of false information, without the spreading of rumours and fears, without the verbal transmission of inopportune opinions ..."* (1988b:3).

In June 1989, I was informed that authorization for the continuation of my research had been given by the National Research Council (CNPq) and by the Presidency of FUNAI, and that I could collect it at the Regional Superintendency in Manaus before proceeding to the Indian area. However, when I arrived in Manaus, FUNAI agents informed me that my permit had not yet arrived and sent me to the headquarters of the Programa Waimiri-Atroari. From my first encounter with the manager, he showed himself to be against the presence of people in the Indian area who do not work in the Programa, presenting himself as an "indigenista" [17] who sees most anthropological research as "academic" and "without any immediate benefits" for the Indians. He made clear that he was opposed to the continuation of my research, alleging that the Waimiri-Atroari had not shown any interest in my research plan when it was presented to them by agents of the Programa, and that they only wanted the presence of people in their area who work in the Programa. Some functionaries of the Programa's administrative direction complained, despite the "preliminary consultation" which they had made five months before, that

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[16] art. 6º of FUNAI Edict 745, 06.07.88. A new Edict issued by FUNAI's president, nº.0242/93, dated 18-03-93, permits "the researcher to go to the (Indian) area to discuss with the Indian community his(her) research proposal" (art. 5º, First Paragraph) for a maximum period of 30 dias, and, in the case of the approval of the research project by the Indian group, FUNAI then authorizes the research.

[17] A professional in indigenism.

FUNAI had not directed me to the Programa before issuing the research authorisation [18]. They insisted on a meeting organized by the Programa, in which I would present my research project to the "Indian Community" in order that it may be endorsed, considering that they alleged that the Indian leaders of the settlement where the principal captain resides had not shown any interest whatsoever in the continuation of the research.

I showed myself to be favourable to the consultation with the Indians [19], although the course of events revealed that the Indians' decision was influenced by false information. The manager of the Programa Waimiri-Atroari informed me that I would have to travel with him from Manaus to the Indian area in a vehicle of the Programa on 24 June, together with the special secretary of the Regional Superintendent of FUNAI. However, contrary to what he had arranged, when I arrived at the headquarters of the Programa Waimiri-Atroari, I was told that the manager of the Programa and the special secretary of the Regional Superintendent had already gone to the Indian area, and that he had arranged for another vehicle to take me.

When I reached the FUNAI base in the Waimiri-Atroari area, in the evening of 24 June, the Waimiri-Atroari abruptly changed their behaviour towards me. During the previous days, several Waimiri-Atroari that were at the Programa headquarters in Manaus had treated me with their usual friendliness, inviting me to return to their villages and asking me to take manufactured goods for them as they always did during my previous 17 months of fieldwork. However, on 24 June, these same people refused to talk to me.

On the morning of 25 June 1989, during the meeting to consult the Indians [20], they were irritated, alleging that my research brought no benefits for them and that they had not seen any results, identical allegation to that expressed previously by the manager of the Programa. From the beginning of the meeting, the Waimiri-Atroari accused me of being a "liar" and of having "cheated them". Some captains and young men told me that they did not know what I was doing in the past, but that they now know that I am linked to entities

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[18] Considering that the Interministerial Edict n° 278 of 18 November 1988 gives FUNAI and the CNPq the power to issue authorisation to enter Indian areas, the manager and some other functionaries of the Programa's coordination appealed to item 13 of the Presidential Edict of FUNAI n° 782/88. After a delay of 13 days from the day on which FUNAI in Brasilia informed me that it had been signed, the authorisation arrived with the requirement that I "present my research project to the Indian Community...in order that it may be endorsed".

[19] During the previous periods of fieldwork, I always consulted the Waimiri-Atroari, personally, in each settlement, to obtain their acceptance, besides the "preliminary consultations" carried out by FUNAI before I arrived in the area. It is worth mentioning that in other situations, since the emergence of the Indian movement in Brazil in the 1970s, some Indian populations are exercising their right to accept or refuse the presence of ethnologists in their areas, demanding that less unequal relations be established between the researcher and the population with whom he (she) works than has frequently been the case in the past (Ferreira, 1991). This has led to new approaches in ethnology, in which the ethnologist incorporates the question of his (her) own presence in the interethnic contact situation, gives the Indians their voice, and publishes works of co-authorship with some of them.

[20] Described in detail in Fieldwork Report submitted to the Museu Paraense Emílio Goeldi, Belém, Pará, on 11.07.89. In the meeting, approximately forty Waimiri-Atroari were present, with representatives from each of the then ten Indian settlements in the area.

which are opposed to their development. They requested that I leave their area immediately and never return.

Surprised, I asked them the origin of such accusations. Several young captains, appointed by FUNAI, replied that "everybody knows" and that it is "in the newspapers", angrily reiterating their accusations of "liar" and demanding my immediate withdrawal from their territory. The meeting disbanded as the Waimiri-Atroari walked away, shouting accusations at me. At this point, the special secretary of the Regional Superintendent of FUNAI revealed an important fact which clarified what was happening, commenting that the Waimiri-Atroari had read a series of articles with the title "Indians and the new Constitution", published nearly two years before, in August 1987, in the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo [21] and republished in newspapers of Manaus. In two of these articles my name appeared, presenting me as if I were an agent of a supposed international "tin cartel" who was supposedly using Indians as a pretext to try to prevent the advance of private national mining companies over Indian territories, with the intention of defending international tin-mining interests.

It thus became clear that the so-called "consultation meeting" with the Indians had been organized by top functionaries of the Programa Waimiri-Atroari to ban my research and discredit me and my research, using calumnious newspaper articles to frame me, in the presence of the Waimiri-Atroari Indians, as a person linked to "entities opposed to the development of the Waimiri-Atroari community", in the words of the special secretary of the Regional Superintendent of FUNAI. As the meeting broke up, I was immediately taken out of the Indian area in a vehicle of the Programa, now accompanied by its manager and the special secretary of the Regional Superintendent of FUNAI, while the Waimiri-Atroari present angrily shouted the same accusations against me.

What is clear is that the Waimiri-Atroari had not been informed that the documents presented by this newspaper, denouncing a supposed international conspiracy against national sovereignty, were judged to be "worthless" by a Parliamentary Inquiry Commission set up in 1987 to investigate the matter.

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[21] From 09.08.87, the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo, one of the principal conservative newspapers in Brazil, started publishing, every day for one week, this series of articles called "Indians in the new Constitution", denouncing a supposed international "conspiracy" against Brazil, organized by people and groups who declare that they are defending Indian interests. These denunciations, directed especially against part of the progressive Catholic Church which supports Indian rights, were widely commented on (CNBB, CIMI, 1987; CEDI, 1987; Oliveira, 1990:25-30). They were part of a campaign of pressures being made by large private mining companies to introduce in the Constitution a device which would facilitate their aims of advancing over Indian lands. During the Parliamentary Inquiry, set up to investigate the matter, when the documents presented were judged to be "worthless", the director of the newspaper, Júlio de Mesquita Neto, despite his refusal to disclose their source, publically declared that he was favourable to the policies of Paranapanema in Indian territories. The previous Constitution only permitted government mining companies to operate in Indian territories, in the case of "strategically important minerals", despite the fact that many private mining companies ignored this prohibition. The lobby of the private mining companies succeeded in changing this, opening up the legal possibility of mining by private Brazilian companies with national capital (art. 176, § 1º), although only with authorization from the National Congress (art. 49, XVI, and art. 231, § 3º), after hearing the Indian communities affected (art. 231, § 3º) and guaranteeing their participation in the results of the mining.

A few months after the banning of my research, in Brasília, the Programa's supervisor told me that when he spoke to some Waimiri-Atroari about the incident, they said that they would not have objected to my presence if I had asked for their authorization, but that I had arrived in the area without asking them. I emphasize that I had applied for authorization through the National Research Council and FUNAI, by the only way permitted for an ethnological researcher and according to the norms set out by FUNAI. Since FUNAI controls access to the Waimiri-Atroari territory, there are no other ways to communicate with the Indians. If the Waimiri-Atroari had not been informed about my application for authorization to carry out ethnological research, this would have revealed a lack of co-ordination between FUNAI and the Programa Waimiri-Atroari. However, the "preliminary consultation", dated January 1989, reveals that the Programa not only had been informed of my research proposal beforehand, but that from that time, certain people within the administration presented it to the Waimiri-Atroari as not being of interest either to the Indians or to the Programa.

### **Who Benefitted from the Banning of my Research**

The way in which I was banned from the Waimiri-Atroari area fits into the present model of government indigenist policy, resorting to the rhetoric of self-determination in which the decision has to be made, ostensibly, by the Indians themselves. It fits into a wider process in which pressures exerted by large companies over the Indian population privilege certain Indians, aiming to entice leaders to sign direct agreements with companies in the name of Indian self-determination. It is easy to see that this is a directed "self-determination", constructed within a wider context of domination. In this case, certain functionaries of the Programa, organizing this calumnious campaign against the researcher, through the Waimiri-Atroari, were resorting to the model used by workers of the former FUNAI Attraction Front to drive out "inconvenient" individuals. The censuring the "inconvenient" researcher came from functionaries of Programa's administrative direction, being transmitted by means of the captains and young men to the rest of the Waimiri-Atroari, and received by these as an order from the Programa which had to be obeyed. As the captain of the Samaúma settlement explained to his wife, just after my research had been banned, the principal captain had given the **order** for me to be removed from the area.

During the period of the Attraction Front, this model of driving people out of the area was articulated between groups of FUNAI workers to drive out certain heads of Indian Posts and administrative directors as part of the power struggle among the workers, involving the captains and other Waimiri-Atroari in order to "legitimate" the removal of "inconvenient" individuals as being a decision made by the Indians. In the case of my being banned from the area, the model was brought into action by some functionaries of the administrative direction of the Programa in a campaign that mobilized all the captains as well as other representatives from all the settlements. This fact reveals how the Programa continues to act as a total institution - which has become even more evident than during the period of the Attraction Front - incorporating the Waimiri-Atroari within its police-like structure so that they act as Indian spokesmen for decisions which come from the administrative direction.

The Programa Waimiri-Atroari had, in 1990, fifty-seven employees [22] and, in the

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[22] Of the 57 functionaries, 46 were posted in the Waimiri-Atroari area, according to the

part of the Indian Reserve which was dismembered by Presidential Decree in 1981, there are several thousands of workers of Mineração Taboca. At that time, this mining company maintained armed workers of a security company controlling the access to a private road inside the Indian area. Taking this situation into consideration, why then such an organised campaign to discriminate an ethnological researcher who does not destroy non-renewable resources, and does not have a negative impact on the life of the Indians nor on the environment? (vide Oliveira, 1988a).

My doctorate thesis reflects on indigenist policies during the period in which this area was called a FUNAI Attraction Front. Oliveira, commenting on the thesis, remarks that "In the everyday life of an attraction front described, the facts do not appear as denunciations, but it is not possible to describe the situations of real conduct omitting the factors of domination and violence" (1989b:30). Is it that some functionaries of the Programa are concerned that the continuation of the research might reveal aspects which might damage its public image? Or that it might reveal that the Programa continues to act over the Waimiri-Atroari as a total institution directed by the interests and pressures of large companies? That the Indian self-determination which emerges in the context of the Programa is subordinated to these interests and pressures?

Evidently, the Programa Waimiri-Atroari concerns itself with presenting a favourable public image, depending as it does on financing from the World Bank. There is a concern to incorporate scientists from highly regarded scientific institutions such as the Amazonian National Research Institute (Inpa), Federal Universities and the Royal Botanic Gardens, London, to undertake research of great value in areas such as ethnobotany, ecology and linguistics, mostly studies of short duration in the Indian area. The Programa uses this fact to argue that it has a "scientific" base to give it credibility. At the same time, certain people in the administrative direction resort to the manipulation of false information to stir up the Waimiri-Atroari against the continuation of an ethnological research project - mine - for which 17 months of field-work, started in 1980, had already been carried out.

Oliveira observes that "Generally research of scientific nature is always understood by FUNAI functionaries as an administrative inquiry and something which might threaten their jobs, create rumours, or result in the indisposition of the Indians towards them" (1989b:30). The Programa promotes research under its supervision through direct agreements with researchers or research carried out by its own employees, selectively prohibiting research which, among other themes, examines indigenist policy [23]. This prohibition was planned, using calumnious tactics so as to irreversibly effect the research and the relationship of the ethnologist with the Waimiri-Atroari.

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Technical-Administrative Report of the Programa Waimiri-Atroari (FUNAI/ELETRONORTE), 1990.

[23] The banning of my research was selective and personalised, as was made clear by the attitude of the "Programa's" manager. After reading my report about the incident, he immediately contacted the anthropologist responsible for the scientific expedition (a bureaucratic requirement of the Brazilian government), inviting him, or any anthropologist from the Museu Goeldi (where I was doing research at the time) except me, to go to the Waimiri-Atroari area and observe the results of the "Programa". Considering that I was the only researcher at the Museu Goeldi, at this time, who had carried out research with the Waimiri-Atroari, his invitation was no more than a proposal to visit the area for him to show off the "Programa's" indigenist work.

One of the arguments used by the Programa's manager, to explain the selective approval of research, was that only research which has immediate practical benefits for the Indians and the Programa is approved by the Waimiri-Atroari. Whatever the reasons given by the directors of the Programa, the selective prohibition is applied to research projects which do not conform to the criteria of the directors, and is transmitted to the Waimiri-Atroari captains, who, in turn, transmit it to the other Waimiri-Atroari. The captains affirm that they are exercising their right of decision, since they were incorporated into the administration as captains according to their willingness to transmit decisions made by the administrative direction, and this is the way that the direction specifies that they should present such decisions.

During the meeting set up to ban my research, some Waimiri-Atroari who are most intimate with the Programa's workers characterized my research as "gossip", the same word used also by the Programa's manager in referring to my doctorate thesis [24]. Accounts given by people who were in the area after my research was banned state that some Indians commented that "Stephen is good for nothing. He will never be able to return here", and, on being questioned about the reasons, added that the "Programa says that Stephen is good for nothing". These accounts confirm that the Waimiri-Atroari made clear that someone had told them, before the meeting to ban my research, that it "was of no interest".

Other facts shed light on the prohibition to enter the Indian area of researchers who are independent of the government indigenist administration. Some functionaries of the Programa's administration present it as an alternative to the dependence on the mining company which existed in the period of the FAWA (Baines, 1988, Chapter IV, 2.iv). Yet, according to declarations of people who were in the area in 1990, the Programa continued to take Indians for medical and hospital treatment with Paranapanema while it has not implanted its own hospital. In addition to this, the mining company continues to provide supplies to the Waimiri-Atroari as part of the "indemnification" for the construction of a private road which cuts through about 38 kms. of their territory, linking the BR-174 highway to the area which was dismembered from the Reserve in 1981. The cattle-raising project, introduced in some settlements by Paranapanema during the period of the FAWA, also continues, and the Programa's manager intended to extend it to other Indian settlements in the area. This project originated from a development plan for the area drawn up by representatives of the Army, Paranapanema and FUNAI, in 1983, having as its principal objective the sedentarization of the Waimiri-Atroari in greatly reduced areas through the implantation of model-farms financed by Paranapanema to facilitate the intentions of this group of companies to advance further over the Indian territory.

Several months after the banning of my research in the Waimiri-Atroari area, I found out that on 24 June 1989, the same day on which I had been taken to the Waimiri-Atroari area by the Programa to consult the Indians, and a few hours before my arrival at the FUNAI base, a new agreement "Termo de Compromisso No. 001/89" had been signed directly between Mineração Taboca S.A. (Paranapanema) and ten Waimiri-Atroari captains appointed by FUNAI, to undertake development projects for the Indian community,

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[24] In the "1st Seminar of Waimiri-Atroari Studies", organized by the University of Amazonas, in March 1990, with the support of the "Programa Waimiri-Atroari", the same manager of the "Programa" publically referred to my thesis as "gossip-ology" (A Notícia, Manaus, 7/3/90, O Povo, Manaus, 7/3/90), not being willing, however, to clarify what he meant by this.

allocating "advanced monthly payments of future royalties that will be owed by the COMPANY to the COMMUNITY for the mining activities" which Paranapanema intends to carry out within the remaining Indian area. This "Agreement" was also signed by representatives of Paranapanema together with the same manager of the Programa Waimiri-Atroari (a FUNAI employee) and the then Regional Superintendent of FUNAI [25], who signed as witnesses.

This "Termo de Compromisso" includes a "Declaration" signed by five Waimiri-Atroari captains on 15 May 1987, as well as correspondence between FUNAI and the mining company which followed, dated June 1989. The "Declaration", signed also by the manager of the Programa and an ex-Regional Superintendent of FUNAI, as witnesses, together with representatives of the mining company, states that the Waimiri-Atroari community, represented by five leaders, decided to exploit mineral wealth within the Indian area in exchange for royalties, choosing, exclusively, the Paranapanema Group to carry out the prospecting and mineral extraction. The "Declaration" is written in a rhetoric of Indian self-determination, giving the impression that the decision to exploit minerals and the exclusive choice of Paranapanema came from the Waimiri-Atroari. However, the wording of the document and the asymmetry of the proposal reveal that the Waimiri-Atroari captains who signed it had not been adequately informed of the tragic consequences for their survival as an ethnic group of any advance of mining companies over their territory, already threatened by invasions of the same company which is seriously polluting the River Alalaú, the major river in the Indian area. It reveals, on the contrary, that these captains were enticed to sign the document under company pressures articulated by local FUNAI functionaries, including the manager of the Programa.

The inequalities of these illegal agreements (since mining on Indian lands can only be carried out with the approval of the National Congress according to the Brazilian Constitution) become evident when examined in the local context. Only from 1978 did the first Waimiri-Atroari come to live at the FUNAI Indian Posts. An educational programme for the Waimiri-Atroari was started in 1985, at first only at one Indian Post. The captains appointed by FUNAI are a small group of Waimiri-Atroari who have been submitted to an intensive indoctrination by FUNAI agents to support Paranapanema's interests, in a "national security" rhetoric, without being given access to adequate information as to the ethnocidal consequences of an advance of mining companies over what is left of their territory.

All these documents, signed by a few Waimiri-Atroari and representatives of Paranapanema and FUNAI go against the Brazilian indigenist legislation, as also does a "Contract of Utilization of the ground for Mining Purposes" between six companies of the Paranapanema Group and FUNAI, signed by its then President, Romero Jucá Filho, authorizing the exploitation of minerals in all the Waimiri-Atroari Indian area. The FUNAI functionaries who articulated this "contract" with Paranapanema, in 1987, also enticed the principal captain of the Waimiri-Atroari and his brother to sign it. It is worth mentioning that the signing of this "contract", occurred when the principal captain and his brother were brought to Brasília by FUNAI, in 1987, accompanied by the Regional Superintendent and

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[25] The name of the Regional Superintendent of FUNAI who signed this "Agreement" appears as Coordinator of Special Projects in FUNAI's **"Calha Norte Special Project: Yearly Operative Plan 1988"**.

the same manager of the Programa. It is part of a series of irregularities used against this Indian population to favour private mining companies by means of illegal agreements of ethnocidal consequences.

The mining companies of the Paranapanema Group have not been able to use these documents to advance further over the Waimiri-Atroari lands, since the complementary legislation governing mining in Indian territories according to the 1988 Brazilian Constitution has not yet been drawn up, making the documents invalid. The Programa has also demarcated an area for the Waimiri-Atroari [26]. However, the demarcation of their lands is, in itself, no guarantee that their territory will be respected. The mining companies are adopting a new strategy in collaboration with the government - to favour the demarcation of Indian areas and to exercise economic pressures to entice new Indian leaders to enter into direct agreements with the companies in exchange for royalties, in the name of "self-determination".

The incidents mentioned above shed light on the motives which led certain functionaries of the Programa Waimiri-Atroari to resort to such a well organized campaign to ban the continuation of anthropological research, thus permitting their exclusive control, not only over the Waimiri-Atroari and their access to information, but also over the first-hand access to information about the Programa Waimiri-Atroari by people who are not directly subordinated to its administration [27]. They have succeeded, by the use of false information, in discrediting me in the eyes of the Waimiri-Atroari, and publically questioning my research [28], thereby eliminating any possibility of my being able to serve

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[26] Decree nº.94.606, 14-07-87. According to information provided by the Programa, an area of 2,585,911 hectares has been demarcated, with homologation Decree nº.97.837, 16-06-89. The area does not, however, reincorporate the tributary streams of the River Alalaú, occupied and polluted by the mining company, polluting one of the principal rivers which passes through the Waimiri-Atroari territory.

[27] The Programa Waimiri-Atroari is carrying out an intensive marketing campaign using mass-media techniques: its own publications, newspaper articles, videos and documentary films, a Seminar in Manaus in 1990 organized in collaboration with the University of Amazonas, and an exhibition in September 1993 in the Shopping Centre of Manaus, to transmit to the public, at a national level, the official view of its directors.

[28] In the "1st Seminar of Waimiri-Atroari Studies", I, together with two other people, the anthropologist Márcio Silva and the missionary Egydio Schwade, who were invited, refused to participate, since we had been recently banned from the Indian area (see Associação Brasileira de Antropologia, 1990: "Research: Limits prevent participation". *Boletim da ABA*, nº 8:11). We were referred to as people who were not fulfilling our responsibility to the Waimiri-Atroari, and only wanting to come to the Indian area at our own convenience (identical accusation made to me by the "Programa's" manager before I was banned from the area). According to Manaus newspapers (*A Notícia*, 7/3/90), I was referred to as a "controversial researcher". The invitation, I received, in an envelope of the "Programa", was seen by me, now that the Programa had lost all credibility from my point of view after such a calumnious campaign used against my research, as yet another attempt to publically defame me even more, in the presence of the press. According to people who participated in this Seminar, certain Waimiri-Atroari captains reiterated some of their accusations against me during the Seminar and publically declared that they never again want my presence in the area. In late 1992, I received a letter from the principal captain Waimiri-Atroari and his brother, asking me to go to their area to explain my book based on doctoral thesis. I replied, suggesting that they might

as a witness to what is happening in the Waimiri-Atroari area. Clearly I know "too much" about the intentions of Paranapanema in this area, and understand "too much" of the Waimiri-Atroari language to be trusted by the Programa, since it could not totally control my access to information given by the Waimiri-Atroari. The Programa Waimiri-Atroari thereby reveals itself to be a closed "total institution" that has captured the Waimiri-Atroari population.

### Conclusion

The banning of this research coincides with a systematic policy of interrupting ethnological research, especially in the region of the Calha Norte Project, framing researchers within arguments put forward in the National Security Council studies (see Oliveira, 1990:29-30), as if they were part of a supposed conspiracy against so-called "national interests".

The banning of the entry of ethnologists to Indian areas, many of whom are carrying out research in these areas for many years, reveals a fundamental change in the conditions of the production of anthropological knowledge. In Brazilian Amazonia, this change is directly related to the alliance between top-level military personnel and entrepreneurs of huge mining companies to implant an infrastructure with the intention of opening up the whole region to exploit mineral resources, including Indian territories. The refusal to issue authorization for ethnological research frequently occurs during the bureaucratic procedures of applying for it. Applications pass through the Advice Council of Strategic Matters (Assessoria de Assuntos Estratégicos), a new name given to the ex-National Security Council. Such a strategy prevents any contact between the ethnologist and the Indian population. In other cases, as mine, the banning is organized by functionaries of the local administration, involving the Indians to make it appear that they are exercising their legitimate right to self-determination.

The anthropologist, as never before, finds him (her)self in an entanglement of conflicting and contradictory interests, with the emergence of functionaries at the top levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy of government indigenist administrations who appropriate an "anthropologized" rhetoric, placing themselves in opposition to ethnologists. They produce official "theories" which focus on the opposition "We indigenists (professionals in indigenism)" / "You anthropologists", trying to legitimate a false dichotomy which they have invented between action and theory, often expressed as "We indigenists who are doing something for the Indians" / "You anthropologists who remain shut up in your cocoon, theorizing in academic institutions", as did the Programa's manager in my case. In the situation of encapsulment and control in which Indian populations such as the Waimiri-Atroari

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first come to the University of Brasília for a few weeks to discuss my book and obtain a notion about anthropology (different from that presented by the direction of the Programa). They did not reply, but on meeting one of them in Brasília in September 1993, he informed me that they do not like my book or my research, and that they do not want to come to the University of Brasília. If I do not go to their area, I shall be accused of being an anthropologist who does not return anything to the Indians and, in the words of the manager, "wrote a thesis only for personal interest, which offers nothing for the Waimiri-Atroari". On the other hand, if I do go, I shall be subjected to a new version of the "expulsion" of 1989, this time well documented by the Programa's administration to "prove" that the Waimiri-Atroari are exercising their right to "self-determination" in rejecting my research.

are placed, these official theories are transmitted to the Indians who are incorporated in posts created by the administration and subordinated to it. Such attitudes and philosophies are received by these Indians as orders to be obeyed as part of their duties and part of a "FUNAI" and "Programa" style, and thus as part of an official theory which defines the "reality" (as it should be) for the Indian population. Such official theories, attached and subordinated to company interests and expressed in a rhetoric of Indian self-determination, defend developmentalist models put forward by large companies, Army personnel, and key persons in the Federal Government, representing the absolute denial of Indian self-determination. They manifest themselves as a discourse imposed by the administration through an extreme paternalism which reflects, above all, the social relations of subordination/domination between the indigenist administration and the Indian population.

It must be stressed that, in situations which are very different from that of the Waimiri-Atroari, other Indian populations are negotiating directly with mining companies and with the military, without indigenist administrations acting as intermediaries in this process and controlling it. This occurred, for example, in the case of a faction of Tukano Indians from the Upper Rio Negro region, an Indian population which in contrast to the Waimiri-Atroari have a long and intensive history of contact with the national society as well as having played a decisive role in the development of the Indian movement at a national level, who entered into agreements with the direction of the Calha Norte Project in 1986-87, and with Paranapanema. They accepted, "After long years of crusade through endless halls in Congress and in the federal government, in an exhausting and demoralising struggle to get their lands properly demarcated" (Ramos, 1991), the cutting up of their territory proposed by the military, in exchange for promises of "schools, hospitals and other services as well as royalties from the mining company which ... had the backing of the military ... Two years later they felt betrayed both by the mining company and by the military" (Ibid.). Paranapanema abandoned this part of the Tukano Indian area as being not economically worthwhile, and the military did not fulfil their promises, instead, driving 123 Tukano out of their own area (Buchillet, 1990:128-135).

Finally, the fieldwork situation in Brazil is becoming more and more complex, despite a great variety of local differences. The case of the Waimiri-Atroari is an extreme example in which the action of indigenist administrations, subordinated to the pressures of large companies, has taken the form of a total institution which has incorporated the Indians in a regime of "restricted liberty".

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